
POLICY NUMBER: 2.05.200**EFFECTIVE DATE:** 3/20/03**TITLE:** Proxy Voting**SUPERSEDES:** 12/20/01**BOARD ADOPTION:** 3/20/03**APPROVED:** *Joseph A. Dear*

PURPOSE:

This policy provides guidelines for voting proxies of the companies in which the Washington State Investment Board (WSIB) retains a direct equity position. Proxy voting may be performed by staff, contracted to a third-party vendor, delegated to the investment manager or performed as part of the responsibilities of a commingled fund/partnership.

Currently, the WSIB participates in commingled funds in the following equity areas: passive domestic, passive international, active emerging markets and defined contribution options. In these cases, the WSIB does not retain a direct equity position, but holds units in an institutional commingled fund or shares in a mutual fund. The fund is responsible for establishing appropriate guidelines and voting proxies.

Mutual funds are used in some of the defined contribution plans that the WSIB administers. Like commingled funds, mutual funds are responsible for voting the proxies of the securities that they hold in the fund. These proxies are voted according to the guidelines outlined in the mutual fund prospectus. The WSIB votes the proxies of the individual mutual funds themselves. These proxies usually address changes in fund structure and the appointment of directors.

The WSIB does hold direct equity positions in its active developed markets international portfolios. In an effort to maximize timeliness and minimize the cost of translations, the proxy voting of international portfolios is delegated to the investment manager.

POLICY:

The WSIB or its delegates vote all proposals submitted to stockholders in the best interest of the beneficiaries of the trust to which it has a fiduciary duty. In exercising its judgment with respect to voting proxies, the WSIB or its delegates are governed by their primary duty to advance the economic value of the companies whose securities are held within the boundaries of prudent and responsible corporate behavior. If after careful and thoughtful consideration the WSIB or its delegates believe that the position of corporate management could adversely affect the long-term value of the company, the proxy will be voted against management consistent with the policy adopted by the WSIB.

The basic fiduciary requirements under common law are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The prudent investor rule, as applied to proxy voting, means that a fiduciary must carefully analyze the implications of proxy proposals. These duties are (1) the fiduciary actually votes the proxies the

plan is entitled to vote; (2) that the votes are made after careful study of the issues; and (3) that reasons can be shown why the votes cast were in the best interest of the plan beneficiaries.

Strategic Role

American corporations are the cornerstones of the free enterprise system, and as such must be governed by the principles of accountability and fairness inherent in our democratic system. The shareholders of American corporations are the owners of such corporations and the directors elected by the shareholders are accountable to the shareholders. The WSIB, in turn, is accountable to their fund beneficiaries. This policy is designed to ensure our manager's continually maximize investment return at a prudent level of risk for the exclusive benefit of fund beneficiaries.

Domestic Equity

The WSIB subscribes to the principles and policies adopted by The Council of Institutional Investors (CII). The CII is an organization of large public funds, labor funds, and corporate pension funds which seeks to address investment issues that affect the size or security of plan assets. Its objectives are to encourage member funds, as major shareholders, to take an active role in protecting plan assets and to help members increase return on their investments as part of their fiduciary obligations. It is recognized as a significant voice for institutional shareholder interests. A copy of the CII principles and core policies as of March 2002 is attached. (The latest copy is available on the internet at http://www.cii.org/corp_governance.asp. CII updates this document annually in March.

International Equity

Proxy voting in international markets differs somewhat from proxy voting in the U.S. markets due to the various country specific laws and regulations. CII principles and core policies form the basis for voting international proxies and the WSIB's international managers have agreed in theory with CII principles and policies. In implementing this philosophy, the WSIB's international managers follow conventions considered best practice internationally which allow for differences in local market conditions.

Original Policy Adopted 6/29/81

Revised 12/15/92

Revised 11/18/93

Revised 2/20/97

Revised 12/18/97

Revised 12/20/01

Revised 3/20/03

Corporate Governance Policies

The Council of Institutional Investors' corporate governance policies establish goals and guidelines for the effective governance of publicly traded corporations. The policies include fundamental core policies that the Council believes should be implemented by all companies, general principles of shareholder rights and board accountability, and a number of more general position statements on various corporate governance issues. It is the Council's hope that corporate boards will meet or exceed these standards and adopt similarly appropriate additional policies to best protect shareholders' interests.

The Council believes that all publicly traded companies and their shareholders and other constituencies benefit from written, disclosed governance procedures and policies. Although the Council believes that the meaningful oversight a board provides may owe most, on a routine basis, to the quality and commitment of the individuals on that board, policies also play an important governance role. Policies can help an effective board perform optimally in both routine and difficult times, and policies can help individual directors and shareholders address problems when they arise.

The Council supports corporate governance initiatives that promote responsible business practices and good corporate citizenship. The Council believes that the promotion, adoption and effective implementation of guidelines for the responsible conduct of business and business relationships are consistent with the fiduciary responsibility of protecting long-term investment interests.

Consistent with their fiduciary obligations to their limited partners, the general partners of venture capital, buyout and other private equity funds should use appropriate efforts to encourage the companies in which they invest to adopt long-term corporate governance provisions that are consistent with the Council's Core Policies, General Principles and Positions or other comparable governance standards. (Click [here](#) for a copy of a sample letter addressing this issue that institutional investors may send to general partners of venture capital, buyout and other types of private equity funds.)

Council policies bind neither members nor corporations. They are designed to provide guidelines that the Council has found to be appropriate in most situations. Most of the following policies have withstood the test of over a decade of corporate experience. But members are aware that situations vary and Council members only raise policy issues in particular situations when underlying facts warrant.

CORE POLICIES

1. All directors should be elected annually by confidential ballots counted by independent tabulators. Confidentiality should be automatic and permanent and

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- apply to all ballot items. Rules and practices concerning the casting, counting and verifying of shareholder votes should be clearly disclosed.
2. At least two-thirds of a corporation's directors should be independent. A director is deemed independent if his or her only non-trivial professional, familial or financial connection to the corporation, its chairman, CEO or any other executive officer is his or her directorship. (See explanatory notes.)
 3. A corporation should disclose information necessary for shareholders to determine whether each director qualifies as independent, whether or not the disclosure is required by state or federal law. To assist shareholders in making these determinations, corporations should disclose all financial or business relationships with and payments to directors and their families and all significant payments to companies, non-profits, foundations and other organizations where company directors serve as employees, officers or directors. (See explanatory notes for the types of relationships that should be disclosed.)
 4. Companies should have audit, nominating and compensation committees. All members of these committees should be independent. The board (rather than the CEO) should appoint committee chairs and members. Committees should have the opportunity to select their own service providers. Some regularly scheduled committee meetings should be held with only the committee members (and, if appropriate, the committee's independent consultants) present. The process by which committee members and chairs are selected should be disclosed to shareholders.
 5. A majority vote of common shares outstanding should be required to approve major corporate decisions concerning the sale or pledge of corporate assets which would have a material effect on shareholder value. A sale or pledge of assets will automatically be deemed to have a material effect on shareholder value if the value of the assets at the time of sale or pledge exceeds 10 percent of the assets of the company and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. Shareholder Voting Rights

1. Each share of common stock, regardless of class, should have one vote. Corporations should not have classes of common stock with disparate voting rights. Authorized unissued common shares that have voting rights to be set by the board should not be issued without shareholder approval.
2. Shareholders should be allowed to vote on unrelated issues individually. Individual voting issues, particularly those amending a company's charter, bylaws, or anti-takeover provisions, should not be bundled.

3. A majority vote of common shares outstanding should be sufficient to amend company bylaws or take other action requiring or receiving a shareholder vote.
4. Broker non-votes and abstentions should be counted only for purposes of a quorum.
5. A majority vote of common shares outstanding should be required to approve major corporate decisions including:
 - a. the corporation's acquiring, other than by tender offer to all shareholders, 5 percent or more of its common shares at above-market prices;
 - b. provisions resulting in or being contingent upon an acquisition other than by the corporation of common shares having on a pro forma basis 20 percent or more of the combined voting power of the outstanding common shares, or a change in the ownership of 20 percent or more of the assets of the corporation, or other provisions commonly known as shareholder rights plans, or poison pills;
 - c. abridging or limiting the rights of common shares to (i) vote on the election or removal of directors or the timing or length of their term of office, or (ii) make nominations for directors or propose other action to be voted on by shareholders, or (iii) call special meetings of shareholders or take action by written consent or affect the procedure for fixing the record date for such action;
 - d. permitting or granting any executive or employee of the corporation upon termination of employment, any amount in excess of two times that person's average annual compensation for the previous three years; and
 - e. provisions resulting in the issuance of debt to a degree that would excessively leverage the company and imperil the long-term viability of the corporation.
6. Shareholders should have the opportunity to vote on all equity-based compensation plans that include any director or executive officer of the company. Shareholders should also have the opportunity to vote on any equity-based compensation plan where the number of reserved shares, together with the company's outstanding equity-based awards and shares available for grant, may have a material impact on the capital structure of the company and the ownership interests of its shareholders. Generally, five percent dilution represents a material impact, requiring a shareholder vote
7. Shareholders should have better access to the proxy for corporate governance issues.

B. Shareholder Meeting Rights

1. Corporations should make shareholders' expense and convenience primary criteria when selecting the time and location of shareholder meetings.

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2. Appropriate notice of shareholder meetings, including notice concerning any change in meeting date, time, place or shareholder action, should be given to shareholders in a manner and within time frames that will ensure that shareholders have a reasonable opportunity to exercise their franchise.
3. All directors should attend the annual shareholders' meeting and be available, when requested by the chair, to answer shareholder questions.
4. Polls should remain open at shareholder meetings until all agenda items have been discussed and shareholders have had an opportunity to ask and receive answers to questions concerning them.
5. Companies should not adjourn a meeting for the purpose of soliciting more votes to enable management to prevail on a voting item. Extending a meeting should only be done for compelling reasons such as vote fraud, problems with the voting process or lack of a quorum.
6. Companies should hold shareholder meetings by remote communication (so-called electronic or "cyber" meetings) only as a supplement to traditional in-person shareholder meetings, not as a substitute.
7. Shareholders' rights to call a special meeting or act by written consent should not be eliminated or abridged without the approval of the shareholders. Shareholders' rights to call special meetings or to act by written consent are fundamental ones; votes concerning either should not be bundled with votes on any other matters.
8. Corporations should not deny shareholders the right to call a special meeting if such a right is guaranteed or permitted by state law and the corporation's articles of incorporation.

C. Board Accountability to Shareholders

1. Corporations and/or states should not give former directors who have left office (so-called "continuing directors") the power to take action on behalf of the corporation.
2. Boards should review the performance and qualifications of any director from whom at least 10 percent of the votes cast are withheld.
3. Boards should take actions recommended in shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast for and against. If shareholder approval is required for the action, the board should submit the proposal to a binding vote at the next shareholder meeting. This policy does not apply if the resolution requested the sale of the company and within the past six months the board retained an investment banker to seek buyers and no potential buyers were found.
4. Directors should respond to communications from shareholders and should seek shareholder views on important governance, management and performance matters.
5. Companies should disclose individual director attendance figures for board and committee meetings. Disclosure should distinguish between in-

person and telephonic attendance. Excused absences should not be categorized as attendance.

D. Director and Management Compensation

1. Annual approval of at least a majority of a corporation's independent directors should be required for the CEO's compensation, including any bonus, severance, equity-based and/or extraordinary payment.
2. Absent unusual and compelling circumstances, all directors should own company common stock, in addition to any options and unvested shares granted by the company.
3. Directors should be compensated only in cash or stock, with the majority of the compensation in stock.
4. Boards should award chief executive officers no more than one form of equity-based compensation.
5. Unless submitted to shareholders for approval, no "underwater" options should be repriced or replaced, and no discount options should be awarded.
6. Change-in-control provisions in compensation plans and compensation agreements should be "double-triggered," stipulating that compensation is payable only (1) after a control change actually takes place and (2) if a covered executive's job is terminated as a result of the control change.
7. Companies should disclose in the annual proxy statement whether they have rescinded and re-granted options exercised by executive officers during the prior year or if executive officers have hedged (by buying puts and selling calls or employing other risk-minimizing techniques) shares awarded as stock-based incentive or acquired through options granted by the company. Such practices reduce the risk of stock-based incentive compensation awarded to executive officers and should be disclosed to shareholders.
8. Since stock options granted to employees, directors and non-employees are compensation and have a cost, companies should include these costs as an expense on their reported income statements with appropriate valuation assumptions disclosed.

POSITIONS

A. Board Shareholder Accountability

1. Shareholders' right to vote is inviolate and should not be abridged.
2. Corporate governance structures and practices should protect and enhance accountability to, and equal financial treatment of, shareholders. An action should not be taken if its purpose is to reduce accountability to shareholders.

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3. Shareholders should have meaningful ability to participate in the major fundamental decisions that affect corporate viability.
4. Shareholders should have meaningful opportunities to suggest or nominate director candidates.
5. Shareholders should have meaningful opportunities to suggest processes and criteria for director selection and evaluation.
6. Directors should own a meaningful position in company common stock, appropriate to their personal circumstances.
7. Absent compelling and stated reasons, directors who attend fewer than 75 percent of board and board-committee meetings for two consecutive years should not be renominated.
8. Boards should evaluate themselves and their individual members on a regular basis. Board evaluation should include an assessment of whether the board has the necessary diversity of skills, backgrounds, experiences, ages, races and genders appropriate to the company's ongoing needs. Individual director evaluations should include high standards for in-person attendance at board and committee meetings and disclosure of all absences or conference call substitutions.

B. Board Size and Service

1. A board should neither be too small to maintain the needed expertise and independence, nor too large to be efficiently functional. Absent compelling, unusual circumstances, a board should have no fewer than 5 and no more than 15 members. Shareholders should be allowed to vote on any major change in board size.
2. Companies should set and publish guidelines specifying on how many other boards their directors may serve. Absent unusual, specified circumstances, directors with full-time jobs should not serve on more than two other boards. If the director is a currently serving CEO, he or she should only serve as a director of one other company, and do so only if the CEO's own company is in the top half of its peer group. No person should serve on more than five for-profit company boards.

C. Board Meetings and Operations

1. Directors should be provided meaningful information in a timely manner prior to board meetings. Directors should be allowed reasonable access to management to discuss board issues.
2. Directors should be allowed to place items on board agendas.
3. Directors should receive training from independent sources on their fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities. Directors have an affirmative obligation to become and remain independently familiar with company operations; directors should not rely exclusively on information provided to them by the CEO to do their jobs.
4. The board should hold regularly scheduled executive sessions without the CEO or staff present. The independent directors should also hold regularly

scheduled in-person executive sessions without non-independent directors and staff present.

5. If the CEO is chairman, a contact director should be specified for directors wishing to discuss issues or add agenda items that are not appropriately or best forwarded to the chair/CEO.
6. The board should approve and maintain a CEO succession plan.
7. Auditor Independence Policy:
 - An external auditor should not perform any non-audit services for its audit clients, except (1) services that are required by statute or regulation to be performed by a company's external auditor, such as attest services, (2) services related to tax return preparation, provided that such services should not include (a) the provision of advice regarding the structuring or any transaction, (b) serving as the company's advocate or representative in the tax audit process, (c) unless, however, these services are in connection with acquisitions or divestitures of company subsidiaries or businesses, (3) accounting and tax services provided in connection with an acquisition or divestiture. Under no circumstances should a company's external auditor provide (1) non-audit services currently prohibited by SEC regulation, (2) financial information systems design or implementation services, (3) internal audit consulting services, or (4) management consulting services.
 - To ensure that the provision of permitted non-audit services does not compromise the external auditor's independence, a company's management and the audit committee of the board of directors should formulate an auditor independence policy; compliance should be monitored by the board of directors. The audit committee should be composed exclusively of directors who are independent under the definition set forth in these Core Policies and Principles and its pre-approval should be required for any contract for non-audit services in excess of \$50,000 to be entered into with the company's external auditor.
 - To permit shareholders to monitor the provision of non-audit services, the company should disclose in its proxy statement the auditor independence policy and the fees paid by the company for each category of non-audit services. The proxy statement should also include a copy of the audit committee charter, contain a statement by the audit committee that it has complied with the duties outlined in the charter, confirm that the audit committee pre-approved contracts for non-audit services as described above, and contain a statement by the audit committee that it believes that the external auditor's independence has not been impaired by the audit firm's provision of permitted non-audit services.

- In engaging the external auditor's services, the audit committee or the full board, not the company, should be designated as the auditor's client. The full board or the audit committee should seek competitive bids for the external audit engagement no less frequently than every five years.

D. Compensation

1. Pay for directors and managers should be indexed to peer or market groups, absent unusual and specified reasons for not doing so. Boards should consider options with forward contracts to align managers' interests with shareholders'.

EXPLANATORY NOTES TO CORE POLICIES

(INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR DEFINITION)

An independent director is someone whose only nontrivial professional, familial or financial connection to the corporation, its chairman, CEO or any other executive officer is his or her directorship.

NOTES: Independent directors do not invariably share a single set of qualities that are not shared by non-independent directors. Consequently no clear rule can unerringly describe and distinguish independent directors. However, members of the Council of Institutional Investors believe that the promulgation of a narrowly drawn definition of an independent director (coupled with a policy specifying that at least two-thirds of board members should meet this standard) is in the corporation's and all shareholders' ongoing financial interest because:

- independence is critical to a properly functioning board,
- certain clearly definable relationships pose a threat to a director's unqualified independence in a sufficient number of cases that they warrant advance identification,
- the effect of a conflict of interest on an individual director is likely to be almost impossible to detect, either by shareholders or other board members, and,
- while an across-the-board application of any definition to a large number of people will inevitably miscategorize a few of them, this risk is sufficiently small that it is far outweighed by the significant benefits.

Stated most simply, an independent director is a person whose directorship constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation. The definition approved by members of the Council contains this basic formulation. It then adds to it a list of the relationships

members believe pose the greatest threat to a director's independence. The existence of any such relationship will remove a director from the independent category.

The following notes are supplied to give added clarity and guidance in interpreting the specified relationships.

A director will not generally be considered independent if he or she:

- a. is, or in the past five years has been, employed by the corporation or an affiliate in an executive capacity;

NOTES: The term "executive capacity" includes the chief executive, operating, financial, legal and accounting officers of a company. This includes the president, treasurer, secretary, controller and any vice-president who is in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance) or performs a major policymaking function for the corporation.

An "affiliate" relationship is established if one entity either alone or pursuant to an arrangement with one or more other persons, owns or has the power to vote more than 25 percent of the equity interest in another, unless some other person, either alone or pursuant to an arrangement with one or more other persons, owns or has the power to vote a greater percentage of the equity interest. For these purposes, equal joint venture partners meet the definition of an affiliate, and officers and employees of equal joint venture enterprises are considered affiliated.

Affiliates include predecessor companies. A "predecessor" of the corporation is a corporation that within the last ten years represented more than 80 percent of the corporation's sales or assets when such predecessor became part of the corporation. Recent merger partners are also considered predecessors. A recent merger partner is a corporation that directly or indirectly became part of the corporation or a predecessor within the last ten years and represented more than 50 percent of the corporation's or predecessor's sales or assets at the time of the merger.

A subsidiary is an affiliate if it is at least 80 percent owned by the corporation and accounts for 25 percent of the corporation's consolidated sales or assets.

- b. is, or in the past five years has been, an employee or owner of a firm that is one of the corporation's or its affiliate's paid advisers or consultants;

NOTES: Advisers or consultants include, but are not limited to, law firms, accountants, insurance companies and banks.

- c. is, or in the past five years has been, employed by a significant customer or supplier;

NOTES: A director shall be deemed to be employed by a significant customer or supplier if the director:

-- is, or in the past five years has been, employed by or has had a five percent or greater ownership interest in a supplier or customer where the sales to or by the corporation represent more than one percent of the sales of the customer or supplier or more than one percent of the sales of the corporation,

-- is, or in the past five years has been, employed by or has had a five percent or greater ownership interest in one of the corporation's debtors or creditors where the amount owed exceeds one percent of the corporation's or the third party's assets,

Ownership means beneficial or record ownership, not custodial ownership.

- d. has, or in the past five years has had, a personal services contract with the corporation, its chairman, CEO or other executive officer or any affiliate of the corporation;

NOTES: Council members believe that even small personal services contracts, no matter how formulated, can threaten a director's complete independence. This includes any arrangement under which the director borrows or lends money to the corporation at rates better (for the director) than those available to normal customers -- even if no other services from the director are specified in connection with this relationship.

- e. is, or in the past five years has been, an employee, officer or director of a foundation, university or other non-profit organization that receives significant grants or endowments from the corporation or one of its affiliates;

NOTES: This relationship includes that of any director who is, or in the past five years has been, an employee, officer or director of a non-profit organization to which the corporation or its affiliate gives more than \$100,000 or one percent of total annual donations received (whichever is less), or who is, or in the past five years has been, a direct beneficiary of any donations to such an organization.

- f. is, or in the past five years has been, a relative of an executive of the corporation or one of its affiliates;

NOTES: Relatives include spouses, parents, children, siblings, mothers and fathers-in-law, sons and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law, aunts,

uncles, nieces, nephews and first cousins. Executives include those serving in an "executive capacity."

and

- g. is, or in the past five years has been, part of an interlocking directorate in which the CEO or other executive officer of the corporation serves on the board of another corporation that employs the director.